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Universal Adversarial Attack on Attention and
the Resulting Dataset DAmageNet
Sizhe Chen, Zhengbao He, Chengjin Sun, and Xiaolin Huang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Adversarial attacks on deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found for several years. However, the existing adversarial
attacks have high success rates only when the information of the victim DNN is well-known or could be estimated by the structure
similarity or massive queries. In this paper, we propose to Attack on Attention (AoA), a semantic feature commonly shared by DNNs. AoA
enjoys a significant increase in transferability when the traditional cross entropy loss is replaced with the attention loss. Since AoA alters
the loss function only, it could be easily combined with other transferability-enhancement techniques and then achieve SOTA performance.
We apply AoA to generate 50000 adversarial samples from ImageNet validation set to defeat many neural networks, and thus name the
dataset as DAmageNet. 13 well-trained DNNs are tested on DAmageNet, all of them have an error rate over 85%. Even with defenses or
adversarial training, most models still maintain an error rate over 70% on DAmageNet. DAmageNet is the first universal adversarial
dataset and it may serve as a benchmark for robustness testing and adversarial training.
Index Terms—adversarial attack, attention, transferability, black-box attack, DAmageNet.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP neural networks (DNNs) have grown into the main-stream tools in many fields, thus, their vulnerability
has attracted much attention in the recent years. An obvious
example is the existence of adversarial samples [1], which
are quite similar with the clean ones, but are able to cheat the
DNNs to produce incorrect predictions in high confidence.
Various attack methods to craft adversarial samples have
been proposed, such as FGSM [2], C&W [3], PGD [4], Type I
[5] and so on. Generally speaking, when the victim network
is exposed to the attacker, one can easily achieve efficient
attack with a very high success rate.
Although white-box attacks can easily cheat DNNs, the
current users actually do not worry about them, since it is
almost impossible to get the complete information including
the structure and the parameters of the victim DNNs. If the
information is kept well, one has to use black-box attack,
which can be roughly categorized into the query approach
[6], [7], [8] and the transfer approach [9], [10], [11]. The
former one is to estimate the gradient by querying the victim
DNNs. However, until now, the existing query-based attacks
still need massive queries, which can be easily detected by
the defense systems. Transfer approach attacks rely on the
similarity between the victim DNN and the attacked DNN,
which serves as the surrogate model in a black-box attack, in
the attacker’s hands. It is expected that white-box attacks
on the surrogate model can also invade the victim DNN.
Although there are some promising studies recently [12],
[13], [14], the transfer performance is not satisfactory and
a high attack rate could be reached only when two DNNs
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have similar structures [15], which however conflicts the aim
of black-box attack.
Black-box adversarial samples that are applicable to vast
DNNs need to attack their common vulnerability. Since
DNNs are imitating human’s intelligence, although DNNs
have different structures and weights, they may share
semantic features. In this paper, we are focusing on the
attention heat maps, on which different DNNs have similar
results. By attacking the heat maps of one white-box DNN,
we could make its attention lose its focus and therefore fail
in judgement. In fact, some works have been aware of the
importance of attention and put the change of heat map
as an evidence of successful attacks, see. e.g. [11], [16]. But
none of them includes the attention in loss. In our study,
we develop an Attack on Attention (AoA). AoA has a good
white-box attack performance. More importantly, there is
high similarity in attention across different DNNs, making
AoA highly transferable: replacing the cross-entropy loss
by AoA loss increases the transferability by 10% to 15%.
Combined with some existing transferability-enhancement
methods, AoA achieves a state-of-the-art performance, e.g.
over 85% transfer rate on all 12 black-box popular DNNs in
numerical experiments.
Here, we first illustrate one example in Fig. 1. The original
image is a "salamander" in ImageNet [17]. By attacking the
attention, we generate an adversarial sample, which looks
very similar to the original one but with a scattered heat map
(in the lower left corner), leading to misclassification. The
attack is carried out for VGG19 [18] but other well-trained
DNNs in ImageNet also make wrong predictions.
Since AoA is for common vulnerabilities of DNNs, we
successfully generate 50000 adversarial samples that can
cheat many DNNs, of which the error rates increase to over
85%. We provide these samples in the dataset named as
DAmageNet. DAmageNet is the first dataset that provides
black-box adversarial samples. Those images DAmage many
neural networks without any knowledge or query. But the
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Fig. 1: AoA adversarial sample and its attention heat
map (calculated by DenseNet121). The original sample (in
ImageNet: image n01629819_15314.JPEG, class No.25) is
shown on the left. All well-trained DNNs (listed in the first
row) correctly recognize this image as a salamander. The
right image is the generated adversarial sample by AoA.
Difference between the two images is slight, however, the
heat map shown in lower left corner changes a lot, which
fools all the listed DNNs to incorrect predictions, as shown
in the bottom row.
aim is not to really damage them, but to point out the weak
parts of neural networks and thus those samples are valuable
to improve the neural networks by adversarial training [19],
[20], robustness certification [21], and so on.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we will briefly introduce adversarial attack, especially
black-box attack, attention heat map, and several variants of
ImageNet. The Attack on Attention is described in detail in
Section 3. Section 4 evaluates the proposed AoA along with
other attacks and defenses and presents the DAmageNet. In
Section 5, a conclusion is given to end this paper.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Adversarial attack and its defense
Adversarial attacks [22] could reveal the weakness of DNN
by cheating it with adversarial samples, which differ from
original ones with only a slight perturbation. In the humans’
eyes, the adversarial sample does not differ from the original
ones, but well-trained networks make false predictions on
them in high confidence. The adversarial attack can be
expressed as below,
find ∆x
s.t. f(x) 6= f(x+ ∆x)
‖∆x‖ ≤ ε.
When training a DNN, one updates the weights of the
network by the gradients to minimize a training loss. While
in adversarial attacks, one alters the image to increase the
training loss. Based on this basic idea, there have been many
variants on attacking spaces and crafting methods.
For the attacking space, most of the existing methods
directly conduct attack in the image space [2], [23], [24]. It is
also reasonable to attack the feature vector in the latent
space [5], [25] or the encoder/decoder [26], [27]. Attack
on feature space may produce unique perturbation unlike
random noise.
Adversarial attacks could be roughly categorized as
gradient-based [2], [4] and optimization-based methods [3],
[22]. Gradient-based methods search in the gradient direction
and the magnitude of perturbation is restricted to avoid a
big distortion. Optimization-based methods usually consider
the magnitude restriction in the objective function. For both,
the magnitude could be measured by l1, l2, l∞-norm or other
metrics.
To secure the DNN, many defense methods have been
proposed to inhibit the adversarial attack. Defense can be
achieved by adding adversarial samples to the training set,
which is called adversarial training [28], [29], [30]. It is very
effective, but consumes several-fold time. Another technique
is to design certain blocks in the network structure to prevent
attacks or detect adversarial samples [31], [32]. Attack can
also be mitigated by pre-processing images before input to
the DNN [33], [34], [35], which does not require modification
on the pre-trained network.
2.2 Black-box attack
When the victim DNNs are totally known, the attacks
mentioned above have high success rates. However, it is
almost impossible to have access to the victim model in real-
world scenarios and thus black-box attacks are required [36],
[37], [38]. Black-box attacks rely on either query [6], [7] or
transferability [9], [36].
For the query-based approach, the attacker adds a slight
perturbation to the input image and observes the reaction of
the victim model. By a series of queries, the gradients could
be roughly estimated and then one can conduct the attack in
the way similar to white-box cases. To choose the next pixel
to alter for gradient estimation, attackers adopt methods
including Bayes optimization [39], evolutional algorithms
[40], meta learning [41] etc. Since the practical DNNs are
generally very complicated, good estimation of the gradients
needs a massive number of queries, leading to an easy
detection.
For the transfer-based approach, one conducts white-box
attack in a well-designed surrogate model and expects that
the adversarial samples remain aggressive to other models.
The underlying assumption is that the distance between
decision boundaries across different classes is significantly
shorter than that across different models [36]. Although a
good transfer rate has been recently reported in [12], [13],
[14], [42], it is mainly for models in the same family, e.g.,
InceptionV3 and InceptionV4, or models with the same
block, e.g., residual blocks [15]. Until now, cross-family
transferability of adversarial samples with small perturbation
is limited and there is no publicly available dataset of that.
2.3 Attention heat map
In making judgements, humans tend to concentrate on
certain parts of an object and allocate attention efficiently.
This attention mechanism in human intelligence has been
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exploited by researchers. In recent studies, methods in
natural language process have benefited from the attention
mechanism a lot [43], [44]. In computer vision, the same idea
has been applied and becomes an important component in
DNNs, especially in industrial applications [45].
To attack on attention, we need to calculate the pixel-
wise attention heat map, for which network visualization
methods [46], [47], [48] are applicable. Forward visualization
adopts the intuitive idea to obtain the attention by observing
the changes in the output caused by changes in the input.
The input can be modified by noise [49], masking [50], or
perturbation [51]. However, these methods consume much
time and may introduce randomness.
In contrast, backward visualization [50], [52], [53] obtains
the heat map by calculating the relevance between adjacent
layers from the output to the input. The layer-wise attention
is obtained by the attention in the next layer and the network
weights in this layer. Significant works include Layer-wise
Relevance Propagation (LRP) [54], Contrastive LRP (CLRP)
[55] and Softmax Gradient LRP (SGLRP) [56]. These methods
extract the high-level semantic attention features for the
images from the perspective of the network and make DNNs
more interpretable and explainable.
2.4 ImageNet and its variants
To demonstrate and evaluate our attack, we will modify
images from ImageNet as other transfer attacks [12], [13],
[14], [42]. ImageNet is a large-scale dataset [17], which
contains images of 1000 classes and each has 1300 well-
chosen samples. ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition
Challenge (ILSVRC) has encouraged a lot of mile-stone
works [18], [57], [58]. Recently, many interesting variants
of ImageNet have been developed, including ImageNet-A
[59], ObjectNet [60], ImageNet-C, and ImageNet-P [61].
ImageNet-A contains real-world images in ImageNet
classes, and they are able to mislead many classifiers to
output false predictions. ObjectNet also contains natural
images that well-trained models in ImageNet cannot distin-
guish. Objects in ObjectNet have random backgrounds and
viewpoints. ImageNet-C is produced by adding 15 diverse
corruptions. Each type of corruptions has 5 levels from
the lightest to the severest. ImageNet-P is designed from
ImageNet-C and differs from it in possessing additional
perturbation sequences, which are not generated by attack
but by image transformations.
The datasets above are valuable for testing and improving
the network generalization, but DAmageNet is for the
robustness. In other words, samples in the above datasets
differ from the samples in ImageNet and the low accuracy is
due to the poor generalization. In DAmageNet, the samples
are quite similar to the original ones in ImageNet and the
low accuracy is due to the over-sensitivity of DNNs.
3 ATTACK ON ATTENTION (AOA)
To pursue high transferability for black-box attacks, we need
to find common vulnerabilities and attack semantic features
shared by different DNNs. Attention heat maps for three
images are illustrated in Fig. 2, where the pixel-wise heat
maps showing how the input contributes to the prediction.
Even with different architectures, the models have similar
attention. Inspired by the similarity across different DNNs,
we propose to Attack on Attention (AoA). Different to the
existing methods that focus on attacking the output, AoA
aims to change the attention heat map.
Fig. 2: Attention heat maps for VGG19 [18], InceptionV3 [62],
DenseNet121 [58], which are similar even the architectures
are different.
Let h(x, y) stand for the attention heat map for the input
x and a specified class y. h(x, yori) is a tensor with the
dimension consistent to x. The basic idea of AoA is to shift
the attention away from the original class, e.g. decrease
the heat map for the correct class yori, as illustrated in
Fig. 3. In this paper, we utilize SGLRP [56] to calculate the
attention heat map h(x, y), which is good at distinguishing
the attention for the target class from the others. There are
of course many other techniques for obtaining the heat map
to attack, as long as h(x, y) and its gradient on x could be
effectively calculated.
There are several potential ways to change the attention
heat maps.
1) Suppress the magnitude of attention heat maps for
the correct class h(x, yori): When the network atten-
tion degree on the correct class decreases, attention
for other classes would increase and finally exceed
the correct one, which leads the model to seek for
information on other classes rather than the correct
one and thus make an incorrect prediction. We call
this design as the following suppress loss,
Lsupp(x) = ‖h(x, yori)‖1,
where ‖ · ‖1 stands for the componentwise l1-norm.
2) Distract the focus of h(x, yori): It could be expected
that when the attention is distracted from the original
regions of interest, the model may lose its capability
for prediction. In this case, we do not require the
network to focus on information of any incorrect
class, but lead it to concentrate on irrelevant regions
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TABLE 1: Transfer Rate from ResNet50 to Other Neural Networks
Loss/Method DenseNet121 [58] VGG19 [18] ResNet152 [57] InceptionV3 [62] IncRNV2 [63] Xception [64] NASNetL [65]
CW [3] 66.60±1.24% 54.20±4.27% 47.30±4.69% 39.60±2.92% 37.90±4.77% 37.40±2.67% 28.80±2.58%
PGD [4] 67.80±1.83% 54.20±2.56% 46.80±3.71% 38.70±2.25% 35.60±4.21% 37.40±4.08% 28.40±3.17%
Lsupp(x) 66.80±3.37% 57.20±3.96% 54.80±2.50% 43.90±2.78% 41.60±1.66% 40.90±2.60% 33.00±2.53%
Ldstc(x) 67.10±4.04% 56.50±2.28% 55.50±4.15% 45.40±3.77% 40.00±1.82% 41.60±4.07% 31.00±2.17%
Lbdry(x) 50.20±5.26% 49.80±4.39% 44.00±4.05% 34.10±3.34% 32.90±3.22% 31.70±1.86% 21.70±1.29%
Llog(x) 74.90±3.48% 64.20±4.13% 59.20±4.71% 50.10±2.69% 46.20±3.39% 48.00±4.87% 36.30±3.74%
LAoA(x) 78.70±2.54% 64.90±2.01% 63.90±1.98% 53.30±2.27% 48.90±2.65% 50.90±3.01% 41.00±2.00%
Fig. 3: The design of AoA. AoA calculates the attention heat
map by SGLRP after inference. The gradient from the heat
map back-propagates to the input and updates the sample
iteratively. By suppressing the attention heat map value,
one can change the network decision by fooling its focus.
Constantly doing this, the produced adversarial sample
could beat several black-box models.
of the image. The loss could be expressed as the
following distract loss,
Ldstc(x) = −
∥∥∥∥ h(x, yori)max(h(x, yori)) − h(xori, yori)max(h(xori, yori))
∥∥∥∥
1
.
Here, self-normalization is conducted to eliminate
the influence of attention magnitude.
3) Decrease the gap between h(x, yori) and
h(x, ysec(x)), the heat map for the second largest
probability: If the attention magnitude for the
second class exceeds that for the correct class, the
network would focus more on information about
the false prediction, which is inspired by CW attack
[3]. We call it boundary loss and take the following
formulation,
Lbdry(x) = ‖h(x, yori)‖1 − ‖h(x, ysec(x))‖1.
The values of attention heat maps vary a lot for
different models, so the self-normalization may
improve the transferability of adversarial samples.
Therefore, rather than Lbdry, we can also consider the
ratio between h(x, yori) and h(x, ysec(x)), resulting
the following logarithmic boundary loss
Llog(x) = log(‖h(x, yori)‖1)− log(‖h(x, ysec(x))‖1).
Now let us illustrate the attack result on the attention heat
map by distract loss. In Fig. 4, a clean sample in the is drawn
together with its heat maps away from its original class.
Aiming at ResNet50 [57], we minimize Ldstc and successfully
change the heat map such that the attention is distracted to
irrelevant regions (the second right column at the bottom).
This common property shared by the attention in different
DNNs makes the attack transferable, which is the motivation
of attack attention. The generated adversarial sample is
shown in the leftmost in the bottom, which is incorrectly
recognized by all the DNNs in Fig. 4. Additionally, we could
see that the heat map for VGG19 is much clearer, which might
explain the high transferability of its adversarial samples as
shown later and in [15].
Fig. 4: Minimizing Ldstc distracts the attention from the
correct ROI to irrelevant regions and similar distraction could
be observed for different networks.
The transferability across different DNNs could be ob-
served not only for the Ldstc but also for the other attention-
related losses. To compare the above losses’ attack perfor-
mance, we attack on ResNet50 [57] and send the adversarial
samples to other DNNs (see the setting in Section 4 for
details). Two attacks on classification loss, namely CW and
PGD, are also compared as the baseline. The white-box
attack success rates. i.e., the error rates of ResNet50, are
all near 100% but attacks by different losses have different
transferability performance, which is reported in Table 1. The
suppress loss and the distract loss have a better transferability
than PGD and CW. The logarithmic boundary loss is the best
and is hence chosen as the attack target. Moreover, attack
on attention could be readily combined with the existing
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attack on prediction (the cross entropy loss attacked in PGD,
denoted by Lce), resulting in the following AoA loss,
LAoA(x) = Llog(x)− λLce(x, yori), (1)
where λ is a trade-off between the attack on attention and
cross entropy. In this paper, λ = 1000 is suggested such that
the two items have similar variance for different inputs. The
combination further increases the transferability, as shown
in Table 1.
Basically, the adversarial samples are generated in an up-
date process by minimizing the AoA loss LAoA. Specifically,
set x0adv = xori and the update procedure could be generally
described as the following
xk+1adv = clipε
(
xkadv − α
g(xk)
||g(xk)||1/N
)
,
g(x) =
∂LAoA(x)
∂x
.
(2)
The gradient g is normalized by its average l1-norm, i.e.,
||g(xk)||1/N , where N is the size of the image. Further,
to keep the change invisible, we restrict our attack by the
distance from the original clean sample such that the l∞ dis-
tance does not exceed ε. AoA is different from other attacks
merely on the loss. Therefore, transferability-enhancement
techniques developed for directly attacking prediction are
also applicable to AoA. In fact, with optimization modi-
fication [12] or input modification [13], [14], the transfer
performance of AoA gets further improved, as numerically
verified in Section 4.2.
Because of its good transferability on heat maps, AoA
could be used for the black-box attack. The basic scheme is
to choose a white-box DNN, which serves as the surrogate
model for black-box attacks, to attack by update (2). The
adversarial samples generated tend to be aggressive to other
black-box victim models.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of our
Attack on Attention, especially its black-box attack capability
compared to other SOTA methods. Since AoA is a very good
black-box attack, it provides adversarial samples that can
defeat many DNNs in a zero-query manner. These samples
are collected in the dataset DAmageNet. This section will
also introduce DAmageNet and report the performance of
different DNNs on it. We further test the AoA performance
under several defenses and find that AoA is the most
aggressive method in most cases.
4.1 Setup
The experiments for AoA are conducted on ImageNet [17]
validation set. For attack and test, several well-trained
models in Keras Applications [66] are used, including VGG19
[18], ResNet50 [57], DenseNet121 [58], InceptionV3 [62] and
so on. We also use other adversarial-trained models (not by
AoA, indicated by underline). We pre-process with Keras
pre-processing function, central cropping and resizing (to
224). The experiment is implemented in TensorFlow [67],
Keras [66] with 4 NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2080Ti GPUs.
For the attack performance, we care about two aspects:
the success/transfer rate of attack and how large the image
is changed. Denote the generated adversarial sample as
xadv. The change from its corresponding original image
xori could be measured by the Root Mean Squared Error
(RMSE) in each pixel: d (xadv, xori) =
√∑
(xadv − xori)2 /N .
In the experiments, 200 images are randomly selected from
ImageNet validation set and the samples incorrectly pre-
dicted by the victim model are skipped as the same setting
in [15]. Experiments are repeated 5 times and the overall
performance on 1000 samples is reported. All the compared
attacks will be fairly stopped when RMSE exceeds η = 7 and
the perturbation is bounded as ε = 0.1 ∗ 255. In this way,
the number of iterations is about 10 with step size α = 2 as
the setting of [42] and other attacking experiments. We alter
α = 0.5 for MI [12] to avoid a large RMSE distortion.
4.2 Transferability of AoA
We first compare AoA with popular attacks CW [3] and PGD
[4], which aim at classification losses. Specifically, CW uses
the hinge loss and PGD uses the cross entropy loss. For CW,
a gradient-based update is applied to keep the perturbation
small. We carefully tune their parameters, resulting in a better
transferability than reported in [15].
We use AoA, CW, and PGD to attack different neural
networks, and then send the generated adversarial samples
to different models. The average error rates are reported
in Table 2. AoA, CW, and PGD all have a high white-box
attack success rate but the transfer performance varies a lot,
which depends on both the surrogate model and the victim
model. But in all the tested situations, AoA achieves a better
black-box attack performance.
The essential difference of AoA from CW/PGD is the
attack target. The existing effort on improving attack transfer-
ability for CW/PGD is mainly on modifying the optimization
process. For example, DI proposes to transform 4 times
when calculating gradients with probability [13]. MI tunes
momentum parameter for boosting attacks [12]. SI divides
the sample by the power 2 for 4 times to calculate the gradi-
ent [14]. Those state-of-the-art transferability-enhancement
methods could improve the performance for CW/PGD and
are also applicable to AoA.
In Table 3, we report the black-box attack performance
when attacking ResNet with MI-DI and SI. We find that SI is
very helpful and can prominently increase the error rate for
PGD and CW. For other surrogate models, the performance of
MI-DI and SI is similar and could be found in the Supplement
Materials. Applying SI in AoA, denoted as SI-AoA, achieves
the highest transfer rate, which is significantly better than
other state-of-the-art methods.
4.3 AoA under Defenses
Our main contribution in this paper is for black-box attack
by increasing the transferability. It is not necessary that
AoA can break defenses, but indeed, it is interesting to
evaluate the attack performance under several defenses. In
this experiment, we apply PGD, CW, and AoA, all enhanced
by SI to attack ResNet50. We consider defenses that have been
verified effective on ImageNet [68]. Those defense methods
can be roughly categorized as pre-processing based and
adversarial training based, which could be used together.
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TABLE 2: Error Rate (Top-1) of Different Attack Baselines
Surrogate Method DN121 [58] IncRNV2 [63] IncV3 [62] NASNetL [65] RN152 [57] RN50 [57] VGG19 [18] Xception [64]
CW 66.60±1.24% 37.90±4.77% 39.60±2.92% 28.80±2.58% 47.30±4.69% 100.00±0.00% 54.20±4.27% 37.40±2.67%
RN50 [57] PGD 67.80±1.83% 35.60±4.21% 38.70±2.25% 28.40±3.17% 46.80±3.71% 100.00±0.00% 54.20±2.56% 37.40±4.08%
AoA 78.40±2.44% 49.00±1.87% 52.20±2.66% 39.60±3.61% 63.40±2.63% 99.90±0.20% 65.60±2.82% 51.10±2.18%
CW 100.00±0.00% 33.50±2.55% 39.50±1.67% 31.90±2.87% 39.60±2.85% 64.60±3.76% 53.20±3.93% 39.40±1.16%
DN121 [58] PGD 100.00±0.00% 34.00±3.49% 41.70±2.38% 31.90±2.87% 41.50±3.21% 68.90±4.76% 55.50±2.28% 41.50±2.30%
AoA 100.00±0.00% 46.10±2.91% 53.50±3.46% 46.10±2.44% 55.00±2.77% 76.70±2.29% 64.60±2.18% 52.10±2.15%
CW 31.00±1.95% 22.70±3.01% 100.00±0.00% 21.30±0.60% 26.10±3.62% 42.30±2.01% 40.70±3.34% 33.40±1.56%
IncV3 [62] PGD 32.70±2.50% 24.20±2.89% 100.00±0.00% 21.30±1.91% 27.30±2.29% 45.30±1.17% 40.70±3.39% 33.70±3.22%
AoA 39.00±1.79% 30.20±2.77% 100.00±0.00% 32.70±1.81% 34.00±2.93% 52.80±1.69% 45.90±3.98% 45.10±2.08%
CW 85.50±0.84% 62.00±1.67% 69.80±1.60% 62.70±1.21% 60.00±1.61% 77.80±2.04% 100.00±0.00% 68.00±2.39%
VGG19 [18] PGD 87.10±1.20% 64.10±2.03% 71.80±1.63% 63.90±1.77% 63.10±4.14% 82.50±2.63% 100.00±0.00% 71.90±0.97%
AoA 91.40±2.65% 73.70±1.29% 79.80±1.08% 74.20±1.63% 73.50±1.05% 86.60±1.77% 100.00±0.00% 81.00±1.30%
CW 42.40±2.52% 36.20±2.32% 35.30±1.66% 25.60±2.24% 100.00±0.00% 57.70±0.81% 46.00±4.06% 31.90±1.77%
RN152 [57] PGD 42.70±3.19% 35.00±2.47% 34.90±2.96% 24.50±3.05% 98.10±0.97% 55.30±2.71% 43.60±3.61% 30.50±4.87%
AoA 55.90±2.35% 54.20±2.36% 49.60±4.21% 36.40±2.60% 100.00±0.00% 71.50±2.57% 57.20±3.79% 45.60±1.93%
TABLE 3: Error Rate (Top-1) of Transfer Attacks on ResNet50
Method DN121 [58] IncRNV2 [63] IncV3 [62] NASNetL [65] RN152 [57] RN50 [57] VGG19 [18] Xception [64]
CW 66.60±1.24% 37.90±4.77% 39.60±2.92% 28.80±2.58% 47.30±4.69% 100.00±0.00% 54.20±4.27% 37.40±2.67%
MI-DI-CW 66.90±1.91% 39.40±4.03% 42.90±1.59% 32.30±3.83% 50.20±4.74% 99.80±0.24% 57.90±3.40% 39.90±2.92%
SI-CW 80.30±1.86% 46.40±2.22% 51.60±2.60% 38.30±3.53% 63.90±1.50% 99.90±0.20% 66.50±1.67% 48.80±3.70%
PGD 67.80±1.83% 35.60±4.21% 38.70±2.25% 28.40±3.17% 46.80±3.71% 100.00±0.00% 54.20±2.56% 37.40±4.08%
MI-DI-PGD 70.50±1.30% 43.30±3.33% 45.80±2.58% 35.70±3.53% 55.90±3.68% 99.50±0.00% 62.10±1.93% 43.30±2.42%
SI-PGD 81.20±1.63% 48.70±1.91% 53.00±0.95% 38.60±2.06% 66.10±2.46% 100.00±0.00% 69.50±2.10% 49.10±1.59%
AoA 78.40±2.44% 49.00±1.87% 52.20±2.66% 39.60±3.61% 63.40±2.63% 99.90±0.20% 65.60±2.82% 51.10±2.18%
MI-DI-AoA 74.10±1.02% 50.40±2.92% 52.00±3.32% 44.20±3.39% 58.70±3.59% 99.80±0.24% 66.40±4.20% 50.60±3.01%
SI-AoA 90.50±0.89% 64.60±2.71% 66.10±3.89% 57.90±2.20% 78.80±1.75% 100.00±0.00% 80.40±2.73% 64.60±3.07%
Pre-processing based defenses are to eliminate the adver-
sarial perturbation. We use JPEG Compression [33], Pixel
Deflection [34], Total Variance Minimization (TVM) [69]
with parameters they provided. Another idea is to add
the randomness to observe the variance of the outputs. For
example, Random Smoothing [70] makes prediction by m
intermediate images, which is crafted by Gaussian noise from
the input image. We choose m = 100 and the Gaussian noise
scale σ = 0.25 ∗ 255 here.
Adversarial training is to re-train the neural net-
works by adversarial samples. In [71], InceptionV3adv
and InceptionResNetV2adv are designed and [32] proposes
ResNetXt101denoise based on ResNetXt101 [72] with denois-
ing blocks in architectures to secure the model.
Table 4 gives the comprehensive black-box attack per-
formance under defenses. Generally speaking, the pre-
processing defenses decrease the error rate for about 5%
to 10% and SI-AoA maintains the highest transfer rate.
Adversarial-trained models (indicated by underlines) exhibit
a strong robustness to adversarial attacks, including SI-AoA
(but still, it is better than SI-PGD, SI-CW). That means
although samples generated by SI-AoA are different to
others, the distribution can still be captured by adversarial
training. Developing adversarial attacks that can defeat
adversarial training is interesting but out of our scope.
Random smoothing generally has a low error rate but its
interpretation time is much longer than other methods,
generally m times and hence it is not a fair comparison. In
our experiment, random smoothing seems not to work well
in adversarial-trained models, sometimes even oppositely,
which is also interesting but in the field of defenses.
4.4 DAmageNet
The above experiments verify that AoA has a promising
transferability, which then makes it possible to generate
adversarial samples that are able to beat many well-trained
DNNs. An adversarial dataset will be very useful for
evaluating robustness and defense methods. To establish
an adversarial dataset, we use SI-AoA to attack VGG19
to generate samples from all 50000 samples from ImageNet
validation set. Since the original images come from ImageNet
training set and the adversarial samples are going to cheat
neural networks, we hence name this dataset as DAmageNet.
DAmageNet contains 50000 adversarial samples and
could be downloaded from http://www.pami.sjtu.edu.cn/
Show/56/122. The samples are named the same as the
original ones in ImageNet validation set. Accordingly, users
could easily find the corresponding samples as well as their
labels. The average RMSE between samples in DAmageNet
and those in ImageNet is 7.23. In Fig. 5, we show several
image pairs in ImageNet and DAmageNet.
To the best of our knowledge, DAmageNet is the first
adversarial dataset, which can be used to evaluate model
robustness and defenses. As an example, we use several
well-trained models to recognize the images in DAmageNet.
Several neural networks strengthened by adversarial training
are considered as well. The error rate (top-1) is reported in
Table 5. The models are from Keras Application and the test
error may differ from original references. One could observe
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TABLE 4: Error Rate (Top-1) under Defenses (ResNet50 as the surrogate model)
Method Victim None JPEG [33] Pixel [34] Random [73] TVM [69] Smooth [70]
DenseNet121 [58] 80.30±1.86% 64.90±2.40% 67.20±2.20% 64.50±3.99% 70.20±1.63% 60.03±2.26%
InceptionResNetV2 [63] 46.40±2.22% 38.00±2.17% 38.30±0.93% 40.30±3.04% 41.00±1.64% 31.74±2.19%
InceptionV3 [62] 51.60±2.60% 43.20±3.39% 42.70±2.98% 46.20±2.34% 46.10±3.47% 33.48±4.73%
NASNetLarge [65] 38.30±3.53% 31.30±3.09% 32.40±4.12% 35.20±2.93% 34.00±4.57% 23.68±3.68%
ResNet152 [57] 63.90±1.50% 51.40±1.91% 51.60±1.85% 48.90±3.85% 56.60±1.56% 41.24±5.28%
SI-CW ResNet50 [57] 99.90±0.20% 98.50±0.84% 98.70±0.81% 89.50±2.59% 99.60±0.49% 93.40±0.94%
VGG19 [18] 66.50±1.67% 60.70±4.27% 60.60±3.20% 62.90±4.07% 63.30±5.09% 89.75±1.89%
Xception [64] 48.80±3.70% 40.60±3.81% 40.90±3.71% 44.00±2.92% 44.70±3.23% 36.53±4.38%
InceptionV3adv [71] 31.20±1.29% 33.80±2.50% 35.00±3.35% 38.10±3.73% 37.00±4.27% 96.54±1.44%
InceptionResNetV2adv [71] 26.40±1.59% 27.40±2.03% 27.60±2.63% 30.10±4.78% 28.20±3.66% 81.74±3.74%
ResNetXt101denoise [32] 18.00±3.13% 18.20±3.11% 18.20±3.33% 44.40±3.69% 18.10±3.22% 70.40±2.26%
DenseNet121 [58] 81.20±1.63% 65.10±1.24% 66.40±0.58% 64.00±3.44% 69.70±1.29% 60.00±2.26%
InceptionResNetV2 [63] 48.70±1.91% 39.80±0.93% 39.30±0.75% 40.00±3.11% 42.10±0.86% 31.79±1.70%
InceptionV3 [62] 53.00±0.95% 44.80±3.33% 45.00±2.98% 47.90±3.09% 48.30±3.23% 32.59±5.66%
NASNetLarge [65] 38.60±2.06% 30.80±3.59% 31.50±2.92% 34.30±4.07% 34.60±2.96% 23.53±3.35%
ResNet152 [57] 66.10±2.46% 52.80±2.56% 54.10±1.53% 51.50±3.39% 58.40±1.83% 40.24±4.81%
SI-PGD ResNet50 [57] 100.00±0.00% 99.10±0.49% 99.40±0.58% 90.80±1.33% 99.60±0.37% 92.43±1.71%
VGG19 [18] 69.50±2.10% 62.80±3.54% 61.40±4.92% 65.70±3.80% 65.20±4.25% 89.60±1.73%
Xception [64] 49.10±1.59% 40.80±3.59% 43.00±4.02% 43.50±3.89% 44.70±3.37% 37.14±3.35%
InceptionV3adv [71] 31.50±3.08% 34.30±3.44% 35.80±2.99% 39.20±3.14% 38.40±2.85% 96.20±1.13%
InceptionResNetV2adv [71] 26.10±1.98% 27.90±0.86% 28.50±2.51% 29.70±3.64% 29.80±0.93% 81.51±3.47%
ResNetXt101denoise [32] 18.20±2.87% 18.50±2.88% 18.90±3.17% 44.60±3.46% 18.40±3.31% 70.53±2.09%
DenseNet121 [58] 90.50±0.89% 81.00±3.32% 82.10±2.85% 78.00±3.70% 83.70±3.14% 63.40±2.35%
InceptionResNetV2 [63] 64.60±2.71% 56.70±1.72% 58.20±3.91% 57.80±4.37% 59.50±2.63% 34.58±3.24%
InceptionV3 [62] 66.10±3.89% 62.30±3.87% 62.40±4.12% 62.90±2.67% 64.10±3.79% 37.54±6.18%
NASNetLarge [65] 57.90±2.20% 49.20±3.71% 53.00±4.01% 52.70±3.93% 53.00±3.32% 29.34±2.80%
ResNet152 [57] 78.80±1.75% 70.30±3.56% 72.80±4.49% 67.10±2.82% 75.60±3.93% 44.20±5.07%
SI-AoA ResNet50 [57] 100.00±0.00% 99.90±0.20% 99.80±0.40% 95.60±2.13% 99.90±0.20% 94.08±1.20%
VGG19 [18] 80.40±2.73% 77.70±4.43% 78.50±3.77% 77.10±4.52% 79.80±4.04% 89.96±2.18%
Xception [64] 64.60±3.07% 57.60±3.26% 58.40±1.80% 61.10±3.89% 59.00±2.65% 40.91±4.52%
InceptionV3adv [71] 53.70±2.25% 52.70±2.20% 54.90±3.15% 55.10±2.78% 56.20±2.71% 96.21±1.16%
InceptionResNetV2adv [71] 44.00±1.52% 44.20±3.23% 46.20±3.71% 48.00±4.55% 47.00±2.30% 82.27±3.16%
ResNetXt101denoise [32] 18.70±3.01% 19.20±2.71% 19.10±2.97% 44.60±3.48% 19.00±2.88% 70.50±2.26%
Fig. 5: Samples in ImageNet and DAmageNet. The images on the left are original samples from ImageNet. The images on
the right are adversarial samples from DAmageNet. One could observe that these images look similar and human beings
have no problem to recognize them as the same class.
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TABLE 5: Error Rate (Top-1) on ImageNet and DAmageNet
No defense Defenses on DAmageNet
Victim ImageNet [17] DAmageNet JPEG [33] Pixel [34] Random [73] TVM [69]
VGG16 [18] 38.51 99.85 99.67 99.70 99.19 99.76
VGG19 [18] 38.60 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.96 99.99
ResNet50 [57] 36.65 93.94 91.88 92.48 92.52 93.08
ResNet101 [57] 29.38 88.13 85.44 86.23 86.12 87.06
ResNet152 [57] 28.65 86.78 83.93 84.83 84.71 85.68
NASNetMobile [65] 27.03 92.81 90.42 91.43 90.31 91.86
NASNetLarge [65] 17.77 86.32 83.31 84.87 84.91 85.53
InceptionV3 [62] 22.52 89.84 87.82 89.01 88.49 89.59
InceptionResNetV2 [63] 24.60 88.09 85.01 85.95 89.04 86.79
Xception [64] 21.38 90.57 88.53 89.77 86.03 90.32
DenseNet121 [58] 26.85 96.14 93.96 94.85 93.82 95.30
DenseNet169 [58] 25.16 94.09 91.72 92.78 91.78 93.36
DenseNet201 [58] 24.36 93.44 90.52 91.71 90.86 92.45
InceptionV3adv [71] 22.86 82.23 82.03 83.35 82.88 83.95
InceptionV3advens3 [74] 24.12 80.72 80.35 81.68 81.57 82.36
InceptionV3advens4 [74] 24.45 79.26 78.86 79.96 79.76 80.8
InceptionResNetV2adv [71] 20.03 76.42 75.71 76.85 76.86 77.73
InceptionResNetV2advens [74] 20.35 70.70 71.09 72.32 73.32 73.04
ResNetXt101denoise [32] 32.20 35.40 36.27 36.65 55.53 36.21
that i) all the listed 13 undefended models are not robust:
DAmageNet increases the error rate of all 13 undefended
models to over 85%; ii) the 5 listed adversarial-trained models
have a slightly better performance and the error rate is over
70%; iii) DAmageNet resists 4 tested defenses with almost
no drop on the error rate compared to other methods; iv)
feature denoising model shows promising robustness but
simply combining it with pre-processing defence method
does not work well.
5 CONCLUSION
To improve the transferability of adversarial attack, we
are the first to attack on attention and achieve a great
performance on the black-box attack. The high transferability
of AoA relies on the semantic features shared by different
DNNs. AoA enjoys a significant increase in transferability
when the traditional cross entropy loss is replaced with the
attention loss. Since AoA alters the loss only, it could be easily
combined with other transferability-enhancement methods,
e.g., SI [14], and achieve a state-of-the-art performance.
By SI-AoA, we generate DAmageNet, the first dataset
containing samples with a small perturbation and a high
transfer rate (an error rate over 85% for undefended models
and over 70% for adversarial-trained models). DAmageNet
provides a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of DNNs
by elaborately-crafted adversarial samples.
AoA has found the common vulnerability of DNNs in
attention. Also, attention is only one semantic feature and
attacking on other semantic features shared by DNNs is also
promising to have good transferability.
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